Livelihood and Care of the Elderly: Determinants of Public Attitudes in Japan by Bernd Hayo & Hiroyuki Ono
 
Joint Discussion Paper 
Series in Economics 
by the Universities of 
Aachen · Gießen · Göttingen 







Bernd Hayo and Hiroyuki Ono 
 
 
Livelihood and Care of the Elderly: 


















This paper can be downloaded from 
http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/index_html%28magks%29 
 
Coordination: Bernd Hayo • Philipps-University Marburg 
Faculty of Business Administration and Economics • Universitätsstraße 24, D-35032 Marburg 











Livelihood and Care of the Elderly:  









(Toyo University and  






This study analyses public attitudes towards the degree of government involvement in ensuring the 
livelihood and care of the elderly in Japan. Using four waves of individual-level annual data from the 
Japanese General Social Survey collected over the period 2000-2005, we estimate ordered logit 
models with various explanatory variables based on the socio-demographic, economic, political, and 
social background of the respondents. Many significant factors are common for both livelihood and 
care specifications, their effects being qualitatively the same and in line with our prior expectations. 
The estimation results also show positive coefficients of year intercept dummies, implying an increase 
in support of a government-based system over time. Further investigation shows that this trend is 
caused by those who favour government redistribution policies becoming increasingly more consistent 
in their support for a government-based social security system in Japan. 
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One of the greatest challenges facing Japan today is the reform of its social security 
system. As society ages rapidly, some fundamental laws of demography have now become 
apparent even to the general public. In addition, the system is afflicted by political scandals. 
In 2004, many top politicians were reported to have not paid their public pension premiums 
for a number of years, and were forced to resign from their government and party positions. 
Further, a record-keeping blunder of the public pension system was uncovered in 2007 
revealing some 50 million unidentified pension accounts, greatly damaging its credibility. A 
measure to reduce the health insurance expenditure on those aged 75 years and older has 
raised vehement opposition from among not only that group, but also medical professionals, 
the media at large, and politicians including some from the ruling coalition. The government 
is rigorously seeking a reform plan to make the system sustainable in the long-term, while 
cleaning-up the political mess in the short-term. Various opinions have been voiced as to 
what would be the optimal reform plan. However, it seems to be that Japanese are more and 
more sceptic and uneasy about their social security system.  
There are many studies to date that have investigated the effects of the current system and 
possible reforms.
1 However, there is very limited research focusing on people’s opinions with 
respect to the government’s involvement in the provision of old-age livelihood and care.
2 A 
notable exception is Kikuzawa (2005), who investigates the issue of attitudes towards the 
livelihood of the elderly across several countries. She finds that the Japanese level of 
preference for government involvement in the organisation of the pension system is higher 
than that in the US, Australia, and Canada, but lower than that in European countries. She 
also reports that, among many possible factors, only the lowest educational achievement 
(primary school enrolment only) has a significant, positive effect on respondent preferences.
3 
Hayo and Ono (2007) note some methodological weaknesses of the study by Kikuzawa 
(2005) and take up the issue in the framework of a comparative empirical study between 
                                                 
 
1 Notable examples include: Aso (2000), Hatta and Oguchi (1999), Kawase et al. (2007), Komamura et al. (2000; 
Chapter 3), and Suzuki et al. (2005) for public pensions; Tokita (2004), Oguro (2007), and Iwamoto and Fukui 
(2007) for health and long-term care.  
2 There exist several opinion surveys/studies on social security in general, but they tend to be mainly descriptive 
and do not conduct formal econometric analyses (see, e.g., Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (2006)).  
3 For the preferred level of fiscal expenditure, she finds that self-employed status also has a significantly negative 




4 Among other factors, age, higher income, and part-time worker status 
make people more inclined towards the individual option, while retiree status does the 
opposite. Tachibanaki et al. (2006) collected their own survey data, concluding that 
respondents have a high expectation of the government for the provision of social security, 
and that the expectation is greatest for pension and lowest for long-term care. However, they 
draw these conclusions from the ratio of responses only and do not conduct any formal 
econometric analysis.
5 
Arguably, the success of economic reforms, at least in a democracy, is dependent upon 
people’s opinions. In this sense, investigations of the expected objective effects do not 
suffice. Research on subjective aspects of social security reform is essential for shedding 
light on whether: (i) a reform plan would be accepted by various segments of society; and (ii) 
a gap exists between the expected objective developments and subjective perception. Based 
on these fundamental questions, this study attempts to identify various factors in the 
formation of the opinion on the livelihood and care of the elderly in Japan, using several 
waves over the period 2000 to 2005 of a representative public opinion survey.  
More specifically, we use the individual-level data from the Japanese General Social 
Survey (JGSS), conducted by the Osaka University of Commerce. This survey asks opinions 
on the desired degree of government involvement in providing for the livelihood and care of 
the elderly. The focus of the present study is to identify which of various factors of the 
respondents, namely, socio-demographic (such as age or level of education), economic 
(such as personal income or employment status), political (such as support for a political 
party or attitudes towards the role of government in redistribution), and social variables (such 
as opinion on three generations living together or satisfaction with family life), help to explain 
attitudes towards organisation of the social security system in Japan.  
It should be noted that the present study is not about any particular reform plan. Rather, 
it provides insight into the fundamental attitudes towards implementing a government- or 
individual/family-organised system. Such fundamental attitudes strongly affect people’s 
                                                 
 
4 For Japan, they use the 2003 wave of the same survey data as the present study, while for Germany they 
employ the representative survey data set “Deutschland vor der demographischen Herausforderung” (Germany 
facing the demographic challenge) initiated in 2004 by the Bundesverband deutscher Banken (Association of 
German Banks). 
5 For studies on attitudes towards organisation of the pension system in other countries, see Boeri et al. (2001, 
2002), Evans and Kelly (2005) and van Els et al. (2003). For an analysis of the provision of nursing care for the 
elderly in Spain, see Costa-Font et al. (2008).  
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reactions to any specific reform plans. While one can construct a priori hypotheses on the 
possible impact of certain individual characteristics on these fundamental attitudes, it 
remains an empirical question as to whether these actually hold up in practice. It certainly 
would be risky to put forward reform policies based on assumptions not validated by 
empirical tests. By focusing on the subjective aspects of social security reforms and 
establishing the way individual characteristics affect the fundamental attitudes towards the 
organisation of pension, and health and long-term care systems for the elderly, this study 
contributes to an under-researched but nevertheless important field.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Based to a large extent on the rational 
actor assumption, the second section develops theoretical hypotheses about which factors 
are likely going to affect the attitudes towards organisation of the social security system for 
old people. The third section explains the survey and data in detail. After briefly discussing 
the employed econometric methodology, Section 4 reports and interprets the estimation 
results for the assumption of time-invariant coefficients. Section 5 repeats the analyses 
allowing for heterogeneity of influences over time. In Section 6, the marginal effects of the 
identified influencing factors are analysed. The final section concludes the paper with a 
summary, some caveats, and a few avenues for future research.  
 
2. Data Set  
The data set we use in this study is the Japanese General Social Survey (JGSS) - the 
first of its kind in Japan - which contains similar questions to those found in the US General 
Social Survey. The JGSS is organised by the Institute of Regional Studies, Osaka University 
of Commerce, and the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo.6 It is a nationwide 
representative survey collected using a two-stage stratified random sampling process, with 
stratification based on population (of those aged 20 - 89), region, and by size of 
cities/districts. In the present study, we use all available rounds of the JGSS sampled in 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2003, and 2005.  
In the following, we study two dependent variables that are based on the questions:  
 
                                                 
 
6 The Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS) are designed and carried out at the Institute of Regional Studies 
at Osaka University of Commerce in collaboration with the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo 
under the direction of Ichiro Tanioka, Michio Nitta, Hiroki Sato and Noriko Iwai with project manager Minae Osawa. 
The project is financially assisted by a Gakujutsu Frontier Grant from the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, 
Sports, Science and Technology for the 1999-2003 academic years, and the datasets are compiled with 
cooperation from the SSJ Data Archive, Information Center for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of 
Social Science, University of Tokyo.  
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Who do you think should be responsible for the following?  
A) Livelihood of the elderly 
B) Health and long-term care of the elderly 
Answer categories:  
1: Individuals and families    2,  3,  4,    5: Government 
 
Note that answers are coded in such a way that higher numbers indicate greater support for 
delegating responsibility to the government.  
Table 1 presents a summary of the average frequencies over the sample period for the 
answer categories. These figures indicate that in Japan a majority of people opt for a mixed 
system to finance the livelihood of the elderly. If we concentrate on the sum of the 
frequencies to the right and left of the middle category, there is a stronger preference for a 
government-based system by 23 percentage points. Looking at the attitude towards provision 
of care reveals a somewhat different outcome: a majority of respondents are in favour of 
leaving care in the hands of the government. Ignoring the middle category and adding up the 
two options to the left and right, respectively, there is a 39 percentage point difference 
between the two options.  
 
Table 1: Answer frequencies of responsibility for livelihood and care of the elderly 
 Individual/family  ↔  ↔ both ↔  ↔   Government 
Livelihood 8%  13%  35%  25%  19% 
Care 5%  9%  33%  31%  22% 
Note: Number of observations: Livelihood: 12,486; Care: 12,488.  
 
To facilitate the comparison over time, Figure 1 condenses the information of the five-
item scale into simple averages of the two variables of interest. It shows that over the sample 
period the average adult Japanese prefers a more government-oriented system, both for 
ensuring the livelihood as well as the care of the elderly. There is a particularly noteworthy 
upward jump from 2001 to 2002.
7  In the actual empirical analyses below we investigate 
whether attitudes to this question can be explained employing socio-demographic, economic, 
and political variables. 
 
 
                                                 
 
7 The line shown in the graph is based on the means of the two variables. While the focus on an average can be 
misleading in principle, note that in the present case the development of the means is consistent with the 
development of the underlying frequencies for the respective categories.    
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Figure 1: Average support for a government-based system for livelihood and care of the 











Notes: Number of observations: Livelihood: 2000: 2,869, 2001: 2,775, 2002: 2,909, 2003: 1,940, 2005: 
1,993; Care: 2000: 2,869, 2001: 2,776, 2002: 2,909, 2003: 1,943, 2005: 1,991.  
 
3. Developing Testable Hypotheses 
There exists no full-fledged theory on people’s attitudes towards government 
involvement in the livelihood and care of the elderly. Nevertheless, it is useful to structure the 
analysis by developing a priori hypotheses about possible explanatory variables based on 
the assumption of rational actors and/or established patterns of behaviour departing from this 
assumption.
8   From this hypotheses set, we discuss those that allow for empirical 
operationalisation given that the survey questions are available for a five-year sample period.  
Age: We argue that age is one of the most important variables affecting the opinion for 
two reasons. First, it captures a cohort effect, the effect of the respondent being in a 
particular cohort, the members of which are at a particular age during the time of sampling. 
The cohort members are influenced by the dominant norms of the society at their time of 
socialisation. Second, age can also capture a life-cycle effect, which reflects the changes in 
economic constraints and perhaps preferences occurring over a life-time.
9 We  conjecture 
that the cohort effect is negative in both the livelihood and the care of the elderly, because 
Japan was a more conservative society in the past, particularly before World War II, valuing 
individual/family responsibility in many aspects of the society at that time. We suspect that 
the direction of the life-cycle effect is positive both for livelihood and care of elderly. Older 
people support the public social security system more, because they have already paid in a 
                                                 
 
8 The results of the related work by Hayo and Ono (2007) also give some guidance.  
9 For example, entering the labour market, and thereby paying taxes and social insurance premiums, may make 
people more aware of the economic constraints involved. As an illustration for the possibility of changes in 
preferences, assume, for instance, hyperbolic discounting by individuals. At an early age, very few persons would 
think about their livelihood and care when they become old. After moving into adulthood, more concrete attitudes 
about who should support them after retirement will be formed, as the life-cycle phase of old age gradually starts 
to have an impact on the individual’s utility calculus.  
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large amount of contributions. Empirically, it is difficult to separate cohort and life-cycle 
effects when age is the only relevant variable in a repeated cross-section study, as we argue 
in the next section. Moreover, answers will be affected by how the respondent interprets the 
questions about the social security system: Either asking opinion on the responsibility of the 
individual or government in general or concerning personal situation. It is likely that in the 
former case, answers will be dominated by cohort effects, whereas in the latter case life-
cycle effects will be stronger.  
Gender: Men and women may develop different attitudes and opinions towards the 
livelihood and care of their old age. Before becoming old, men may work, earn, and possibly 
save more for their old age than women. On the other hand, women may spend more time 
with their family and develop stronger bonds with them. Women may also tend to be more 
integrated into social networks. Thus, a male-female difference would depend on one of 
these motives being stronger than the other.  
Marital status: If people choose not to get married, they will have no family support to 
rely on when they become old. They can only resort to their private savings or depend upon 
the public system. Thus, from this insurance point of view, our hypothesis is that married 
persons would be relatively more in favour of individual/family-based systems than those 
single.  
Number of children: If people have offspring, they can rely on them for old-age support, 
at least in principle. The more children they have, the better diversified is the “insurance” they 
have for their old age. Thus, we conjecture that they rather oppose the public support option. 
Education:  More educated people know better where and how their taxes and 
contributions are used than those not. Therefore, they may tend to view the public system 
more critically. They may also be more likely to think about their life from an intertemporal 
perspective and be more aware of the economic life-cycle, while less educated people may 
naively expect more support for their livelihood from a public social security system. 
Therefore, our hypothesis is that educated people prefer a more privately-organised system. 
This argument is less compelling in the case of old-age care. The survey asks about the 
highest level of education under both the old and new education systems.
10 We combined 
the two systems and created four dummy variables: mandatory school, secondary education, 
higher education (college), and higher education (graduate school).  
Personal finance: In general, whether a person is financially secure should have an 
influence in shaping her opinion. Our conjecture is: the more financially secure a person is, 
the more she is able to support herself and thus the less she is inclined to support 
                                                 
 
10 In pre-World War II Japan, children had to choose an academic or vocational track if they wanted to pursue 
further education after 6 years of mandatory education. In 1947, the occupation forces overhauled this two-track 
system into a US-style single-track system, extending the mandatory education to 9 years.   
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dependence on social security. The various dimensions of personal finances are measured 
with the help of several questions in the survey detailed below. 
(1) Own employment status: Employment directly affects a person’s financial security. 
We identify the respondent’s employment status using ten different categories.
11 If people do 
not work – and thus do not receive a regular income – they have less means to support their 
life now and when they become old. Japan has seen a tremendous increase in non-regular 
workers including part-time workers – estimated to make up about 30% of the total workforce 
in 2004 – who do not have automatic access to old-age pensions. Therefore, it is natural to 
assume that on average the unemployed tend to rely more on the public sector, both today 
and in the future. To the extent that part-time jobs are characterised by a lesser degree of job 
stability than full-time jobs, a similar situation is likely to emerge. In contrast, full-time 
employees in large corporations in Japan still benefit from “life-long employment”. Thus, our 
hypotheses are that the unemployed will more strongly favour government responsibility, 
followed by part-time workers. Contrary to that, we expect full-time workers to favour 
individual/family-based responsibilities of old age support.  
(2)  Own job environment: Besides the employment status, the survey has several 
questions with implications for the financial security of those employed. The respondents are 
asked: how many hours they worked in the previous week; whether they are employed by a 
large corporation; how many employees work in their corporation; how many years they have 
worked for it; whether they have a second job; if so, how many hours they worked in the 
previous week; whether they are a member of a labour union; and whether there is a chance 
of losing their job within one year. 
(3) Spouse job environment: Personal finances of the spouse, if married, have strong 
implications for the financial security of the respondent. The survey asks about how many 
hours the spouse worked in the previous week and how many employees work in his or her 
corporation. To account for the financial security of a household associated with working for 
a large corporation, we construct an indicator that measures whether one or more household 
members are employed by a large corporation.  
(4)  Budget situation: The surveys ask about the income from the main job and the 
household’s total income. The higher the income, the more financially secure, and hence the 
more inclined respondents will be towards an individual/family-based system. Information 
about the income dynamics of the household is based on a question that measures whether 
the household income situation has undergone any changes. There is also a variable 
capturing a forward-looking income evaluation, namely, whether the respondents expect their 
future pension entitlement to be better or worse than that of current recipients.  
                                                 
 
11  Full-time worker, part-time worker, dispatched from personnel agency, self-employed, family worker, piece 
worker, retiree, unemployed, and other not working.  
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Political orientation and party support: We argue that a person’s general political beliefs 
will affect attitude towards old age support. The political position may of course also be 
influenced by the socio-demographic and economic factors potentially affecting attitude 
towards the livelihood of the elderly. However, in other studies on economic reform, it was 
found that political beliefs may constitute a separate influence from the current economic 
situation (Hayo, 2005). Our hypothesis is that the more people support left-wing political 
positions, the more inclined they will be towards implementing more government 
responsibility in the organisation of the social security system. Empirically, the political 
positions of respondents are measured by their ideological position on a left-right scale, their 
opinion concerning government redistribution policy, and their political party support.  
Information indicator: How much people know about the current situation of the social 
security system should affect their opinions. Our conjecture is that the more they are 
informed, the less confident they will be about the public system, and therefore the greater 
the support for an individual/family-based system. As an indicator for information access we 
employ a variable that measures how often the respondent reads a newspaper. 
Social ties: Family ties may have a significant independent effect. The more people feel 
tied to their family and value such ties, the more likely they will prefer privately-organised old 
age support. We proxy the degree of family ties by utilising three questions from the survey: 
how often the respondents have dinner together with their families, how much they are 
satisfied with their family life, and whether they favour the idea of three generations living 
together. An answer to the last question could also be a manifestation of the dominant norm 
of the society at the time of the respondent’s socialisation and collinear to the cohort-effect 
element of age. However, this should not pose a serious problem, as both variables are 
imperfect indicators of socialization. In addition, we include an indicator for the level of 
general trust of respondents, as arguably trust is important for making work a pay-as-you-go 
social security system across generations and the provision of old-age care.  
Health: The health situation is likely to affect people’s opinion. Our conjecture is that the 
healthier they are, the less concerned they are about their livelihood in old age. The surveys 
ask about the respondents’ health conditions – proxying for objective assessment of health - 
and how satisfied they are with their health condition – a subjective indicator. While in 
general the effect on our variables of interest is unclear, we expect that personal experiences 
with either private or public health care systems will have a substantial effect on the overall 
evaluation by the respondents.  
Community size: People’s opinions about public or private responsibilities with respect 
to livelihood and care of the elderly may depend on whether they live in more urban or rural 
areas. Those persons living in rural areas may tend to have more traditional views and 
values related to the family. In particular, family and personal relationships may play a larger  
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role in their lives independent of the personal experience of respondents within their own 
families being measured by the family tie indicators. Therefore, we expect that those living in 
the rural areas will be relatively more in favour of individual/family-based responsibility than 
urban dwellers.  
Table 2 summarises information on the variables used in this analysis, showing the 
mean values, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients with the two variables of 
interest for each explanatory variable. Concentrating on correlations larger than 10%, we 
find in the case of the livelihood of the elderly that attitudes in favour of a government-
organised pension system are negatively associated with age and the expected size of 
pension, while they are positively viewed by those respondents who support government 
income redistribution. The latter effect is also present in the case of care for the elderly, 
where those whose financial situation has improved over the last few years tend to support 
private care options.  
 
Table 2: Summary statistics for data used in the analysis  
Variable Mean  SD  Correlation  with 
livelihood of the 
elderly 
Correlation with 
care of the elderly
Livelihood of elderly  3.34  1.16    0.67 
Care of elderly   3.56  1.08  0.67   
Age effect:         
 Age  51.8  16.8  -0.11**  -0.06** 
Gender effect:         
 Female  0.54  0.50  -0.02  -0.005 
Marital status:         
 Single  0.15  0.36  0.07**  0.02* 
 Married  0.74  0.44  -0.04**  -0.003 
 Separated/widowed  0.11  0.32  -0.03**  -0.02* 
No. of children  1.73  1.18  -0.08**  -0.05** 
Education:        
 Mandatory  school  0.24  0.42  -0.03**  -0.03** 
 Secondary  education  0.46  0.50  0.02  0.02 
  Higher education (College)  0.29  0.45  0.01  -0.001 
 Higher  education 








Employment status         
 Full-time  employee  0.35  0.48  0.05**  0.03** 
 Part-time  employee  0.13  0.34  0.04**  0.03** 
  Dispatched from personnel 
 agency  0.30  0.16 
0.05** 0.05** 
 Self-employed  0.08  0.28  -0.05**  -0.04** 
 Family  worker  0.05  0.21  -0.03**  -0.02* 
 Piece  worker  0.01  0.10  -0.005  0.01 
 Retirees  0.10  0.29  -0.02  -0.01 
 Unemployed  0.02  0.14  0.02  0.03** 
 Household  0.24  0.42  -0.03**  -0.01 
  Other not working  0.04  0.19  -0.01  -0.004 
Own job environment         
 Working  hours  24.4  23.2  0.03**  0.005 
 Corporation  size  2.08  3.29  0.08**  0.06** 
  Years of work  8.46  12.3  -0.04**  -0.03** 
 Second  job  0.02  0.14  0.005  -0.01 
 Second  job  working 





  Member of labour union  0.12  0.32  0.04**  0.02 
  High probability of job 





Spouse job environment         
  Spouse working hours  18.9  23.6  -0.01  -0.006 
  Spouse corporation size  2.29  3.22  0.02  0.02* 
  Anyone in the household 
  employed by a large 





Budget situation          
  Income main job  4.27  4.32  0.004  -0.003 
 Household  income  9.69  3.01  -0.08**  -0.06** 
  Improvement in financial 









Political orientation         
 Left-right  placement  2.88  0.91  0.08**  0.08** 
 Government  responsible 
 for  reducing  income 







Political party support         
  Liberal Democratic Party  0.21  0.41  -0.09**  -0.09** 
 Democratic  Party  0.05  0.22  0.01  0.02 
  New Komeito Party  0.03  0.17  0.01  0.02 
 Communist  Party  0.02  0.12  0.03**  0.03** 
  Social Democrat Party  0.02  0.12  0.009  0.01 
 Other  party  0.01  0.10  -0.03**  -0.02* 
  No party support  0.51  0.50  0.01  0.001 
Information indicator         
  Frequency of reading a





Social ties         
 General  trust  2.10  0.57  0.03**  -0.01 
  Regular family dinner  5.92  1.68  -0.02  -0.01 
  Satisfied with family life  3.57  1.00  -0.08**  -0.06 
  Desirable for three 
  generations to share a 







Health situation         
 Health  condition  3.44  1.16  -0.06**  -0.06** 
 Health  satisfaction  3.36  1.10  -0.07**  -0.07** 
Community size  1.97  0.65  0.03**  0.02* 
Notes: The variable coding can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. SD: standard deviation. ** (*) 
indicates significance at the 1% (5%) level.  
 
4. Empirical Estimates Using Ordered Logit Models with Time-invariant Coefficients 
The bivariate correlations in Table 2 do not take into account possible interactions 
between the various explanatory variables. Therefore, we conduct multivariate analysis. 
Given the ordered scale of the dependent variable, we employ ordered logit models (see 
Green 2002). Following the general-to-specific modelling strategy advocated by Hendry 
(1993), a consistent testing-down process is applied to this model. In the interpretation of the 
variables, we concentrate on the statistically significant effects of the variables that remain in  
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the equations after the testing-down process. While we report results based upon normal 
standard errors (SEs), it can be shown for all parts of the analysis that using 
heteroscedasticity-robust SEs (White 1980) does not affect our conclusions (results available 
upon request). In this section, we conduct the analysis under the assumption of time-
invariant coefficients of the explanatory variables. The results of estimating the general 
models can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix. The pseudo R
2 values of the different 
models are about 4%, with the models explaining attitudes towards care of the elderly 
showing a slightly better fit. Applying the testing-down procedure on the full models yields the 
reduced models displayed in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Reduced models: Explaining responsibility for livelihood and care of the elderly 
  Livelihood of the elderly  Care of the elderly 
Variable Coefficient  SD  Coefficient  SD 
Age  effect:       
  Age  -0.010**  0.002 0.020** 0.007 
 Age  squared      -0.0002**  0.0007 
Employment  status       
 Self-employed  -0.235**  0.066  -0.242**  0.067 
Own job environment         
 Corporation  size  0.014*  0.006     
Spouse  job  environment       
  Spouse working hours  -0.004**  0.001  -0.006**  0.001 
  Spouse corporation size  0.024**  0.008  0.026**  0.008 
Budget situation          
 Household  income  -0.033**  0.007  -0.022**  0.007 
  Improvement in financial 
 situation 
-0.175** 0.031  -0.227**  0.031 
  Expected size of pension  -0.118**  0.029  -0.105**  0.029 
Political  orientation       
  Left-right  placement  0.077**  0.021 0.094** 0.022 
 Government  responsible 
 for  reducing  income 









Political party support         
  Liberal Democratic Party  -0.182**  0.048  -0.251**  0.018 




Information  indicator       
  Frequency of reading a
 newspaper 
-0.043** 0.016     
Social  ties       
  Satisfied with family life  -0.053**  0.020     
  Desirable for three 










Health  situation       
 Health  satisfaction  -0.086**  0.018  -0.095  0.017 
Time effects   
  Year  2002  0.533**  0.046 0.764** 0.046 
  Year  2003  0.602**  0.054 0.765** 0.054 
  Year  2005  0.922**  0.055 1.177** 0.055 
Cut  values       
  Cut value 1  -3.022  0.175  -2.575  0.223 
  Cut value 2  -1.800  0.172  -1.279  0.220 
  Cut value 3  -0.094  0.171  0.542  0.220 
  Cut value 4  1.198  0.172  2.047  0.221 
No. of observations  10,387  10,390 
Log likelihood  -14,935  -14,199 
LR Test  Chi
2(18) = 1189**  Chi
2(17) = 1220** 
Pseudo R
2 0.038  0.041 
Testing-down restriction  Chi
2(34) = 34.5  Chi
2(35) = 27.2 
Notes: For coding information on variables see Table A1 in the Appendix. SD: standard 
deviation. * (**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) level. 
 
Livelihood of the elderly 
Of the 56 variables in the general model, only 18 survive the testing-down process. The 
remaining variables of the model explaining attitudes towards the livelihood are discussed in 
turn. The table shows age has a significantly negative impact, implying that older people are 
more inclined towards a privately-supported livelihood of old age. This is in line with our 
cohort effect explanation: older people conform to the more conservative social norm of 
Japanese society of the past. However, the age variable may also have picked up the life-
cycle effect, which, as we argue above, tends to push people in favour of the public option as 
they get older. Unfortunately, separating these two effects is not possible here, as we do not  
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have a panel data set. However, it is worthwhile to get at least a rough understanding of the 
life-cycle effect; so we resort to temporal analysis of the aggregate cohort effect. We create 
synthetic age cohorts for 5-year periods and follow their average attitudes over our sample 
time to determine whether there is a trend in the cohort attitudes towards the livelihood of the 
elderly, Table 4 summarises the outcome of regressing these on a deterministic trend.
12  
Most of the cohorts show an increase in support for the government-based system as 
they age, in particular the younger cohorts up to 42 and those with people around retirement 
age. Thus, for most cohorts our conjecture on the aging effect is supported, although the 
short time span does not allow full confidence in the results. These findings suggest that the 
age variable is indeed a mixture of cohort and life-cycle effects and that the former 
dominates the latter throughout all ages in forming the opinion on livelihood of the elderly. 
13 
 
Table 4: Time trends in attitudes towards the livelihood of the elderly over different cohorts 
Cohort  18-22 23-27 28-32 33-37  38-42  43-47 
Trend  ↑  ↔  ↑  ↑  ↑  ↔ 
Cohort  48-52 53-57 58-62 63-67  68-72  73-77 
Trend  ↔  ↔  ↑  ↑  ↔  ↔ 
Note: ↑ (↔) indicates an upward trend (no trend) at a 20% significance level. 
 
Self-employed respondents are supportive of an individual/family-based pension system. 
Under the current system, coverage for the self-employed, classified as Category I insured, 
is “thin” in that compared to company employees the premium they pay is low and so is their 
entitlement. In addition, while the spouses of company employees, Category III insured, do 
not need to contribute themselves in order to be entitled, those of self-employed do, which 
may be viewed as unfair. Further, the survivor’s pension is only payable to a wife with 
children under 18 years old. 
Corporate size has a positive effect on attitudes towards a government-based system. 
Following our conjecture above, this implies that the higher degree of financial stability of 
pension funds paid into by large corporation employees the greater the degree of trust in the 
public system. Additional financial stability is generated if the spouse works for a large 
                                                 
 
12 A constant term is also included in the regression but not reported here to conserve space.  
13 This is also in line with the aging effect interpretation based on a variant of hyperbolic discounting, which would 
reduce the incentive to gather information about important patterns of the pension system that are of relevance in 
the future only.
 There is a (weak) positive correlation between our information indicator (frequency of reading a 
newspaper) and age, which suggests that younger persons are relatively less informed (Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient for age and expected size of pension is 0.13 for those who are not yet retired, which is significant at a 
1% level). Based on our estimations, we would expect younger people to contribute more given their support for 
the government-based system. Empirically, this is not the case; the contribution rate is actually lower in the 
younger age groups (see Yuda (2006), for instance). Given that our data is a repeated cross-section and not a 
panel, we cannot separate the various effects with great precision.  
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corporation, as the pension funds that large corporation employees contribute to tend to be 
more stable than those of other groups of workers. 
A slightly puzzling finding is the higher explanatory power of the spouses’ working 
environment compared to the variables referring to the respondents themselves. In the case 
of working hours, our hypothesis is that this result is driven by female respondents. Long 
working hours are a proxy for future salary increases based on promotion of an employee. 
The gender asymmetry stems from the fact that the probability of promotion for men is higher 
than that for women.
14 To investigate this explanation, we create an additional variable that 
captures spouse working hours for female respondents. The new variable is now significant 
at a 1% level, while the general “spouse working hours” variable becomes insignificant.  
The results for all the other explanatory variables are more or less in line with our prior 
expectations. The three personal finance variables – household income, the change in 
household financial situation, and the future expected pension entitlement – are in line with 
our priors. Those respondents whose households are relatively better off, who have 
improved their budget situation over time, and who expect higher future pensions, are more 
likely to support a privately-organised pension system. 
The same conclusion holds for political and party orientation. Respondents, whose 
political ideology is more left-wing lean towards a government-based system. In addition, 
supporters of the Liberal Democratic Party, who tend to be conservative, are more prone to 
choose an individual/family-based pension system. The frequency of reading books, our 
indicator of information access, also has the expected impact. The more respondents read 
about the current situation of the public pension system the less they are inclined towards the 
government-based option. The more they are satisfied with their family life the more they 
prefer the idea of three generations living together. Moreover, the more they are satisfied 
with their health condition, the greater the likelihood of support for an individual/family-based 
pension system, which is in line with the hypotheses developed above. The negative effect of 
this variable can also be interpreted as a manifestation of the dominant norm of the society at 
the time of the respondent’s socialization similar to the cohort-effect element of age. If such 
an interpretation is correct, it strengthens the cohort-effect element of age, because both 
variables show significant coefficients, at least at the 10% level. 
 
Care of the elderly 
In contrast to the results for livelihood of the elderly, we find a non-linear effect of age 
on care of the elderly as depicted in Figure 2:   
 
                                                 
 
14 According to the 2007 Basic Survey on Female Employment and Management (Table 12) only 6.9% of the 
management positions are filled by female employees.  
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In Section 2, we conjecture that the cohort-effect element of the age variable likely 
pushes people towards the private/individual option, but its life-cycle effect element works in 
the opposite direction. To check whether our conjecture is correct, we generate synthetic 
cohorts again and follow their aggregate attitudes over our sample time. We obtain a similar 
result as that shown in Table 5, implying that aging indeed pushes people in favour of the 
public option. The results provided in Table 3 and Figure 2 can be interpreted as an 
indication that the relative strength of the life-cycle effect vis-à-vis the cohort effect differs 
across time. From a very young to mature age, support for a public social security system is 
dominant because people are at such a life-cycle stage that they may have to make 
substantial compromises in their personal life both personally and career-wise, to care for 
their parents. As people become older they may realise that they will need care for 
themselves in the not too distant future. They start preferring, perhaps due to a growing 
feeling of helplessness, to receive care given by their kin rather than anonymous social 
workers. Thus, over time the cohort effect becomes dominant. The net effect of these 
different effects related to age manifest as an inverted hyperbola. In fact, it is quite 
remarkable that the impact of age on support for public care becomes negative quite 
precisely at the age of retirement.  
 
Table 5: Time trends in attitudes towards care of the elderly over different cohorts 
Cohort  18-22 23-27 28-32 33-37  38-42  43-47 
Trend  ↑  ↑  ↑  ↑  ↑  ↔ 
Cohort  48-52 53-57 58-62 63-67  68-72  73-77 
Trend  ↔  ↔  ↑  ↑  ↔  ↔ 
Note: ↑ (↔) indicates an upward trend (no trend) at a 20% significance level. 
 
Given that we find a preference toward a public system both in the outcome of the 
regression model as well as in the cohort analysis, we cannot be sure that the upward- 
 
18
sloping part of the time pattern in Figure 2 is due to age as it may be driven by cohort effects. 
However, with regard to the more dominating time pattern of falling support for a public 
system with age, we get the result noted above for the livelihood of the elderly, namely, a 
likely underestimation of the negative impact of age in Table 3.  
As in the case of livelihood, being self-employed exerts a positive influence on the 
choice of an individual/family-based care system. Self-employed people receive medical care 
from a different institution, National Health Insurance (NHI; Kokumin Kenko Hoken)  than 
company and government employees. The financial situation of NHI is of great concern.
15 
Various reform measures of the public health insurance system are mainly targeted to this 
segment of the system.
16  
Working hours and company size of the spouse are strongly significant; in fact, this time 
the same variables relating to the respondent themselves are insignificant. In the case of 
explaining the livelihood of the elderly, we were able to show the importance of gender 
effects. Repeating the test discussed above for care of the elderly is not as revealing. Other 
factors might also play a role.
17 To further investigate the issue, we study whether there is a 
life-cycle effect present, in combination with the gender impact discovered above. With age 
women tend to become more concerned about the work position of their husbands than men 
about their wives, many of whom may not be working anyway. Empirically, we test whether 
older women drive the significance of the spouse work variables. The interaction of age, 
female, and spouse working hours and company size, respectively, become significant, while 
the base spouse work variables become insignificant. We take this as evidence that it is 
indeed a combined life-cycle and gender effect that explains the importance of the spouse’s 
working conditions in the determination of attitudes towards the organisation of old-age care.  
The remaining explanatory variables show effects that are consistent with our 
theoretical priors. Household income, improvement in financial situation, expected size of 
pension, political view of left-right placement, supporter of the Liberal Democratic Party, 
desirability of three generations sharing a home and health satisfaction are significant 
explanatory variables and raise the likelihood of support for an individual/family-based care 
system. 
                                                 
 
15 According to the 2008 White Paper (Annual Reports in Health and Welfare) of the Ministry of Health, Labour 
and Welfare, the NHI is the only fund that has recorded a deficit (13.2 billion yen). The other two funds, 
government-managed and health insurance association-managed, recorded a surplus of 141.9 and 295.6 billion 
yen, respectively, in 2005. For more in-depth analysis, see Maeda (2006), for instance. 
16 In 2003, the government announced the Grand Programme for Medicare System Reform, emphasising the 
need to strengthen the financial situation of NHI as one of the four main objectives. 
17 One hypothesis we look at is impact of the (objective or subjective) state of health of the respondent, as a more 
precarious health situation may increase the importance of the spouse. We do not find convincing evidence for 
this hypothesis. Another hypothesis that we investigate is that the self-employed care for the financial security of 




What is not common is that being a supporter of the Communist Party has a significant 
negative effect on individual choice here. This may be due to the fact that the Communist 
Party has a stronger stance on the issue of health insurance reform than on pension 
reform.
18 On the other hand, the frequency of reading newspapers and family life satisfaction, 
which were on the list of influencing factors in explaining the attitude towards the livelihood of 
the elderly, are not significant here. Problems of care for the elderly are more intuitively 
understood than pension problems and, therefore, access to information is not as relevant. 
Whether people are in a “satisfactory” family relationship is not as influential in the case of 
care as in the livelihood context, which might be attributed to the more limited role a family 
can play in the case of disease and injury.  
 
5. Time-variant Coefficient Models 
An important assumption underlying the analysis so far is that coefficients are constant 
over time. The only way time can enter is via the year dummy variables. It is possible, 
however, that the time profile of answers to our variables of interest is affected by changes in 
the influence of certain variables during the sample period. In addition, the significance of the 
year dummies might be spurious as these may just pick up the variation over time of other 
coefficients. To assess the robustness of our analysis so far, we re-estimate the model 
allowing for full temporal parameter heterogeneity. To economise on space, in Table 6 we 
report the reduced model only (omitted results available upon request).  
 
Table 6: Reduced model allowing for time-variant parameters: Explaining responsibility for 
livelihood and care of the elderly 
  Livelihood of the elderly  Care of the elderly 
Variable Coefficient  SD  Coefficient  SD 
Age  effect:       
  Age  -0.010**  0.002 0.020** 0.007 
  Age in 2005      0.008**  0.002 
 Age  squared      -0.0003**  0.0007 
Employment  status       
 Self-employed  -0.232**  0.066  -0.423**  0.083 
  Self-employed in 2001      0.496**  0.161 
  Self-employed in 2005      0.475**  0.182 
                                                 
 
18 For instance, the Japan Communist Party was running a strong campaign to organise opposition against the 




Own job environment         
 Corporation  size  0.015*  0.006     
 Second  job  working 
  hours in 2001 
0.043** 0.016     
Spouse  job  environment       
  Spouse working hours  -0.004**  0.001  -0.006**  0.001 
  Spouse corporation size  0.024**  0.008  0.026**  0.008 
Budget situation          
 Household  income  -0.033**  0.007  -0.023**  0.007 
  Improvement in financial 
 situation 
-0.174** 0.031  -0.225**  0.031 
  Expected size of pension  -0.120**  0.029  -0.104**  0.029 
Political  orientation       
  Left-right  placement  0.071**  0.021 0.091** 0.022 
 Government  responsible 
 for  reducing  income 
 inequality   
0.232**  0.019 0.141** 0.019 
 Government  responsible 
 for  reducing  income 
 inequality  in  2002 
0.143**  0.012 0.210** 0.012 
 Government  responsible 
 for  reducing  income 
 inequality  in  2003 
0.158**  0.014 0.205** 0.014 
 Government  responsible 
 for  reducing  income 
 inequality  in  2005 
0.242**  0.018 0.192** 0.035 
Political party support         
  Liberal Democratic Party  -0.180**  0.048  -0.266**  0.048 
 Communist  Party      0.464**  0.159 
  Communist Party in 2001  1.023**  0.290     
Information  indicator       
  Frequency of reading a
 newspaper 




Social  ties       
  Satisfied with family life  -0.054**  0.020     
  Desirable for three 
  generations to share a 
 home 
-0.088* 0.038  -0.133**  0.038 
Health  situation       
 Health  satisfaction  -0.085**  0.018  -0.095**  0.017 
Cut  values       
  Cut value 1  -3.366  0.174  -3.004  0.222 
  Cut value 2  -2.145  0.171  -1.708  0.219 
  Cut value 3  -0.440  0.170  0.111  0.218 
  Cut value 4  0.856  0.170  1.620  0.219 
No. of observations  10,387  10,390 
Log likelihood  -14,923  -14,189 
LR Test  Chi
2(20) = 1112**  Chi
2(20) = 1240** 
Pseudo R
2 0.039  0.042 
Testing-down restriction  Chi
2(210) = 229.5  Chi
2(212) = 237.5 
Notes: For coding information on variables see Table A1 in the Appendix. SD: standard deviation. * 
(**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) level. 
 
It is important to note that the homogeneity assumption imposed in the previous 
analysis is justified in general. However, there are particular time-dependent effects that 
warrant attention.  
 
Livelihood of the elderly 
Starting with attitudes towards the livelihood of the elderly, we find a significantly 
positive coefficient on second job working hours in 2001. This implies that in this year, those 
respondents who worked a lot of hours in a second job are even more in favour of a 
government-based pension system than in the other years. This could be a reflection of the 
1990’s prolonged recession in Japan – people in recessionary times tending to favour 
greater government support. A similar conclusion holds for the supporters of the Communist 
Party, who by virtue of political principle, tend to favour government support. 
Perhaps more interesting is the development of the effect of attitude towards 
government responsibility for reducing income inequality in the years 2002, 2003, and 2005. 
In each year, the coefficient increases, the coefficient in 2005 being significantly larger than  
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those in the previous years.
19 Note that the year dummies have not survived the testing-down 
process. This indicates that there is no general upward trend in attitudes towards a publicly-
organised pension system as suggested by Figure 1, but rather a strengthening of belief in 
such a system by those respondents who regard the government as responsible for reducing 
income inequality.
20   Or, to put it differently, the measured increase in support of a 
government-based system can be explained by supporters of far-reaching state-intervention 
in the economy applying their core values more consistently to the field of social security.  
One possible interpretation for this phenomenon is offered in the context of the 
structural reform policies rigorously pursued by the government during that time period. As 
soon as Prime Minister Junnichiro Koizumi came into power in 2001, at a time when Japan 
was still suffering from the prolonged recession, he and his Minister of Economic Affairs, 
Heizo Takenaka, introduced various deregulations and privatization programmes. While 
many attribute the macroeconomic recovery, which officially started in April 2003, to their 
market-oriented reform policies, Japanese society has substantially polarized to become 
what is nowadays known as the Kakusa-shakai (“gap society”). We argue that in the light of 
these developments, those who believe in a strong role of the government in the economy 
started to express their opinions much more clearly from around this time.  
 
Care of the elderly 
Moving to the model explaining care of the elderly in the right panel of Table 6, we find a 
similar outcome. The negative impact of age is reduced in 2005, so that the inverse U-shape 
influence shown in Figure 2 is changed. The effect is that the maximum can now be found at 
age 47 and the impact of age is no longer negative over a realistic human lifespan. Thus, in 
the last wave of the survey, the age of the respondent has a positive effect on support for a 
publicly-organised long-term care system. In 2004, Koizumi passed a law to increase the 
self-payment rate for the old (70+) from 20% to 30%. The additional age effect measured in 
2005 could be a reaction to that, as respondents might interpret this new financial burden as 
a consequence of a market-oriented reform programme applied to the publicly-organised 
system instead of viewing it as a necessary step to ensure its financial liquidity. Comparing 
this situation of supposedly market-led re-structuring with the former times of generous 
coverage of health expenditures, respondents support a stronger role of the government to 
ward off these types of reform measures in the future. This interpretation is supported by the 
                                                 
 
19 Testing the coefficient on attitude towards government responsibility for reducing income inequality reveals that 
there is no significant difference between 2002 and 2003 (Chi
2(1) = 0.8), and the coefficient in 2005 is 
significantly larger than that in 2002 (Chi
2(1) = 38.8**) and that In 2003 (Chi
2(1) = 24**) (** indicating significance 
difference at the 1% level).  
20 Note that the average attitude of the Japanese population with regard to a greater role of the government in 
redistribution has not changed very much over the years (minimum: 3.57 in 2002, maximum: 3.75 in 2005).   
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data as it can be shown that it is the younger generation (below 30 years) rather than older 
whose support for the public system increased notably in 2005.
21 This may be more likely an 
expression of protest against the introduction of changes to the existing system rather than 
the outcome of experiencing direct economic disadvantages because of these changes. 
The negative effect of self-employment is no longer significantly different from zero in 
2001 and 2005.
22  As in the livelihood regression, the impact of the attitude towards 
government responsibility for reducing income inequality on support for government-
organised care for the elderly varies over the years 2002, 2003, and 2005. While the year 
dummies become insignificant, there is no statistical difference between the coefficients for 
these three years.
23 Hence, yet again, it is the increase in the coherency of the beliefs of the 
state-intervention supporters that explains the rising level of government-organised care for 
the elderly. The argument relating to the Koizumi structural reform programme applies here 
as well.  
 
6. Computing Marginal Effects  
The interpretation of coefficients of ordered logit models is not straightforward and does 
not allow an easy comparison of the relative strength of effects of the included variables. In 
addition, the coefficients of ordered logit models can be misleading with regard to the effects 
of changes in the explanatory variables on the predicted probabilities of falling under one of 
the categories of the dependent variable (Greene 1991, 703ff). In particular, the estimated 
coefficients do not imply sign restrictions on the effects of changes in the explanatory 
variables on the middle categories. It is therefore useful to compute marginal effects of 
explanatory variables, here evaluated at the sample mean of the other variables. For dummy 
variables, this is not truly a marginal effect but rather the change from zero to one. Note that 
the predicted frequencies of the estimated models in Tables 5 and 6 are fairly close to the 
actual frequencies even in the extreme categories, which indicates a good fit of the models.  
 
Livelihood of the elderly 
In Table 5, we show the marginal effects for the reduced models explaining the 
livelihood of the elderly with the help of time-variant coefficients (Table 6). For reasons of 
brevity, the estimates for the marginal effects of the time-dependent variables have been 
omitted (available upon request).  
                                                 
 
21 Pearson’s correlation coefficient between age and support for a publicly-based care system for the elderly is 
0.13 for respondents below 30 years and -0.004 for those who are 65 and above.  
22  Testing the coefficient of the base effect of self-employment against the coefficients associated with 2001 
(Chi
2(1) = 0.3) and 2005 (Chi
2(1) = 0.1) reveals non-significance.  
23 The outcome of the restriction tests is: coefficient of 2002 against 2003: Chi
2(1) = 0.1; coefficient of 2003 
against 2005: Chi
2(1) = 0.3; coefficient of 2002 against 2005: Chi
2(1) = 0.1.   
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Table 7: Reduced model livelihood of the elderly: Marginal effects of ordered logit 
regressions from Table 6 




↔  ↔ both ↔  ↔ Government 
Age 0.0006**  0.001**  0.001**  -0.001**  -0.002** 
Self-employed 0.015**  0.023**  0.018**  -0.025**  -0.031** 
Corporation size  -0.001*  -0.001*  -0.001*  0.001*  0.002* 
Spouse working 
hours 
0.0003** 0.0004**  0.0004** -0.0005**  -0.0006** 
Spouse corporation 
size 
-0.002** -0.002**  -0.002** 0.002**  0.003** 
Household income  0.002**  0.003**  0.003**  -0.003**  -0.005** 
Improvement in 
financial situation 
0.011** 0.016**  0.016** -0.018**  -0.025** 
Expected size of 
pension 
0.007** 0.011**  0.011** -0.012**  -0.017** 
Left-right placement  -0.004**  -0.007**  -0.006**  0.007**  0.010** 
Government respon-
sible for reducing 

















0.003** 0.004**  0.004** -0.004**  -0.006** 
Satisfied with family 
life 
0.003** 0.005**  0.005** -0.006**  -0.008** 
Desirable for three 












Health satisfaction  0.005**  0.008**  0.008**  -0.009**  -0.012** 
Frequency in %  
(actual / predicted) 
0.08 / 0.07  0.13 / 0.13  0.35 / 0.38 0.25 / 0.26  0.19 / 0.17 
Notes: For coding information on variables see Table A1 in the Appendix. * (**) indicates significance 




The probability that the respondents opt in favour of an individual/family-based pension 
system increases by approximately 0.06 percentage points every year of life, while the 
probability of being in favour of government responsibility decreases by about 0.2 percentage 
points. This means that in Japan, holding all other variables at their mean values or zero, a 
person of 50 years old will be about 3 percentage points more likely to opt for full private 
responsibility of livelihood than an 18-year-old.  
If a respondent becomes self-employed, the model predicts that the probability of 
support for a government-based pension system falls by about 3 percentage points, which is 
similar to an age difference of 30 years, while the probability that he will favour an 
individual/family-based pension system rises by 1.5 percentage points.  
Regarding corporation size, we find relatively small impact of differences between 
different company sizes. For instance, a person moving from a small firm (2-4 employees) to 
a medium-sized firm of about 1,000 employees will experience an increase in preference for 
a government-based pension system by somewhat less than 1.5 percentage points.  
If the spouse’s working hours double starting from an average of 20 hours, the 
probability of supporting the private pension system falls by about 1.2 percentage points, 
while support for a government-based pension system increases by 0.6 percentage points. 
The spouse’s average corporation size is slightly larger than for the respondents themselves, 
which to a certain extent compensates for the larger marginal coefficients.  
Doubling the annual household income from the average of about 5.5 million yen 
decreases the likelihood of choosing the government-based pension system by about 2 
percentage points. For example, the rather unlikely move from the bottom income bracket up 
to the top yields a probability change of 9 percentage points. Considering the budget 
dynamics, if a household moves from the situation of a worsening budget compared to the 
previous year to an improvement, the probability of supporting a government-based option 
goes down by 5 percentage points.  
A jump from the average of a “somewhat worse” expectation about the future pension 
payments to a “somewhat better” expectation lowers support for a government-based 
pension system by about 3.5 percentage points. While this effect is fairly large, there are only 
few respondents in our sample that actually have this type of positive expectation.  
If a person moves from being a full conservative towards being a full liberal, his support 
for a government-based pension system will fall by 4 percentage points. This indicates that 
realistic ideological changes will have modest effects only. Supporting the Liberal Democratic 
Party will raise (lower) the probability of supporting a private (public) pension system by 
about 1 (2.5) percentage point(s). The relatively strongest effect of all factors in explaining 
attitudes on organising a system ensuring the livelihood for the elderly is connected to the 
stance on the responsibility of government when it comes to re-distribution. If someone  
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moves from denying any role of government towards full responsibility, then his probability of 
supporting the publicly-organised pension system increases by more than 13 percentage 
points.  
The effect of information is not particularly large. Assuming a person who never looks at 
a newspaper becomes a daily reader, his probability of supporting the government-based 
system will decline by about 2.5 percentage points. Slightly larger is the impact of satisfaction 
with family life. If the assessment with family life rises from totally dissatisfied to fully satisfied, 
support for the public pension system goes down by about 3 percentage points. Larger is the 
full change in opinion about the issue of three generations living under one roof. Here a 
move from total opposition to full embracement yields a lowering of probability for supporting 
a government-based pension system by over 5 percentage points. Of a similar magnitude is 
the comparable improvement of a person’s subjective health situation.  
 
Care of the elderly 
Table 8 contains the results for the marginal effects for the ordered logit model 
explaining attitudes towards organising care of the elderly estimated in Table 6. Most of the 
marginal effects are similar to those discussed in the previous section.  
 
Table 8: Reduced model care of the elderly: Marginal effects of ordered logit regressions 
from Table 6 
Care of the elderly  Individual / 
family 
↔  ↔ both ↔  ↔ Government 
Age  -0.0007** -0.001** -0.003**  0.002**  0.003** 
Age squared  0.00001**  0.00002**  0.00004**  -0.00002**  -0.00004** 
Self-employed 0.018**  0.034**  0.053**  -0.044**  -0.062** 
Spouse working 
hours 
0.0002** 0.0004** 0.001** -0.0005**  -0.001** 
Spouse corporation 
size 
-0.001** -0.002**  -0.004**   0.002**  0.004** 
Household income  0.001**  0.002**  0.003**  -0.002**  -0.004** 
Improvement in 
financial situation 
0.008** 0.016**  0.032** -0.020**  -0.037** 
Expected size of 
pension 
0.004** 0.008**  0.015** -0.009**  -0.017** 





sible for reducing 













0.010** 0.020**  0.036** -0.025**  -0.041** 
Communist Party  -0.014**  -0.029**  -0.069**  0.026**  0.085** 
Desirable for three 
generations to share 
a home 
0.005** 0.010**  0.019** -0.011**  -0.022** 
Health satisfaction  0.003**  0.007**  0.013**  -0.008**  -0.015** 
Frequency in % 
(actual / predicted) 
0.04 / 0.04  0.10 / 0.09  0.33 / 0.34 0.31 / 0.33  0.22 / 0.20 
Notes: For coding information on variables see Table A1 in the Appendix. * (**) indicates significance 
at a 5% (1%) level. 
 
Noteworthy differences relate to the following variables: Starting with age, a person of 
50 years old will be about 1 percentage points more likely to opt for government 
responsibility of a social security system than an 18-year-old. This effect stands in contrast 
to the one on livelihood above but is still not particularly large. In contrast, the impact of self-
employment is about twice as large in the case of old-age care. Here the probability of 
support for a government-based system falls by about 6 percentage points if a respondent 
becomes self-employed. If a household moves from the situation of a worsening budget 
situation to an improvement, the probability of choosing a government-based option goes 
down by almost 7.5 percentage points. Relatively strong is the effect of political ideology. 
Support for a government-based pension system will fall by 6 percentage points if a person 
moves from being a full conservative towards being a full liberal.  
Relatively larger is the drop in probability of choosing a public care system related to 
becoming a Liberal Democratic Party supporter, which is now 4 percentage points. Yet being 
a supporter of the Communist Party raises the likelihood of preferring a government-based 
social security system by the large margin of 8.5 percentage points. However, a relatively 
smaller effect is to be found in the influence of attitudes towards government re-distribution, 
where a complete reversal of opinion raises the likelihood of opting for the public system by 9 
percentage points only. This is still an important effect but clearly smaller compared to the 
livelihood case: Larger than in the case of the livelihood of the elderly is the impact of the 
variables measuring attitudes towards three generations living under one roof. Here, support 
for the public social security system falls by almost 9 percentage points.  
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Thus, comparing the marginal effects across our two dependent variables, we find that 
political factors play the most dominant role, followed by level and change of household 
income. All other effects are of relatively smaller importance.  
 
7. Conclusion  
This study aimed to tackle a largely unexplored field of opinion formation on the degree 
of government involvement in ensuring the livelihood and care of the elderly. Using 
individual-level data from the Japanese General Social Survey (JGSS), a nationwide 
representative survey data, the investigation attempted to identify which of various factors of 
the respondents, namely, socio-demographic (such as age or level of education), economic 
(such as personal income or employment status), political (such as support for a political 
party or attitudes towards the role of government in redistribution), and social variables (such 
as opinion on three generations living together or satisfaction with family life), help to explain 
attitudes towards organisation of the pension, and health and long-term care systems.  
Given that the responses are ordered qualitative choices on a scale of 1 to 5 and 
ranging from the choice of individual/family responsibility to government/public responsibility, 
we estimated the effects of the explanatory variables selected based on priors and 
availability in ordered logit models. The consistent testing-down procedure eliminated many 
of the variables thought to affect the choice of opinion.  
Many of the remaining variables are common in both the livelihood and care 
estimations: age, self-employed status, spouse work environment, budget situation, political 
orientation, political party support, desirability for three generations sharing a home, and 
health satisfaction. These effects are qualitatively the same for both livelihood and care, 
except for age. Age inclines the respondents toward the individual/family option for livelihood 
but towards the government/public choice for care. The former can be explained by the 
cohort effect dominating the life-cycle effect, reflecting older people’s more conservative 
values. The latter arguably reflects life-cycle effects in that people prefer the public option at 
a working age, when the burden of caring for their old relatives is the greatest, but become 
inclined more towards the individual option as they approach their own retirement.  
Among the variables that are common between the two dependent variables, the most 
noteworthy is that spouse job environment exerts a relatively strong influence. We found that 
gender effects can offer a plausible interpretation. The pronounced effect of the self-
employed can be understood by the fact that they belong to a different pension institution 
than that of company and government employees, which is financially weaker.  
The results of all the other common variables are in line with our prior expectations. 
Government-based social security systems are preferred by persons leaning toward the 
political left, favouring government redistribution, supporting the Communist Party, and  
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whose spouse works for a large corporation. Respondents characterised by self-employment, 
high income, positive income development, a large expected size of pension, Liberal 
Democratic Party support, satisfaction with their health situation, a greater degree of 
information, satisfaction with family life, preference for several generations living under on 
roof are more in favour of individual/family-based social security systems.  
These estimation results also show a significant, positive coefficient of the year intercept 
dummies. To further investigate this and to assess the robustness of our analysis, we re-
estimate the model allowing for full temporal parameter heterogeneity. We find an increase in 
support of a government-based pension and health and long-term care systems over time, 
which can be explained by supporters of far-reaching state-intervention in the economy 
applying their core values more consistently to the field of social security. In the years under 
study, Prime Minister Koizumi’s government (2001-2006) rigorously implemented market-
oriented reforms, which allegedly polarised Japanese society. We argue that in the light of 
these developments, those, who believe in a strong role of the government in the economy, 
started to express their opinions with regard to social security issues much more clearly. 
In this study, we encounter a typical finding in microeconomic studies, namely, that the 
explanatory power of the models is limited. Thus, even allowing for the fact that the pseudo 
R
2 used in the context of ordered logit models cannot be interpreted in a straightforward way 
as the percentage of the explained variance of the dependent variable, there is little doubt 
that attitude formation is much more complex than we assume in our typical economic 
models. Having said so, we strongly believe that this line of research will benefit from 
advancement of the theoretical background, which is lacking at present.  
A separation of general and idiosyncratic effects of personal characteristics on attitudes 
towards the organisation of the pension, and health and long-term care systems could be 
achieved by extending the analysis to other aging societies. The availability of panel data – 
both at an individual and aggregate level – would make it possible to investigate some of the 
effects more thoroughly, for instance, the influence of aging versus cohorts or the impact of 
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Table A1: Coding of variables 
Variable Coding 
Age  min: 20, max: 89 
No. of children   min: 0 max: 10 
Working hours   min: 0, max: 105 
Corporation size  0: N.A.; 1: 1 employee; 2: 2-4, 3: 5-9; 4: 10-29; 5: 30-99; 6: 
100-299; 7: 300-499; 8: 500-999, 9: 1,000-1,999, 10: 2,000-
9,999, 11: >10,000 employees & government employees; DK 
= mean 
Years of work  min: 0, max: 70 
Second job working hours  min: 0, max: 70 
Spouse working hours  min: 0, max: 133 
Spouse corporation size  0: N.A.; 1: 1 employee; 2: 2-4, 3: 5-9; 4: 10-29; 5: 30-99; 6: 
100-299; 7: 300-499; 8: 500-999, 9: 1,000-1,999, 10: 2,000-
9,999, 11: >10,000 employees & government employees; DK 
= mean 
High probability of job loss  1: not at all likely; 2: not too likely; 3: fairly likely; 4: very likely 
Income main job  0: no job income, 1: none; 2: < 700,000 yen per annum; 3: 
700,000-1 million; 4: 1-1.3 million; 5: 1.3-1.5 million; 6: 1.5-
2.5 million; 7: 2.5-3.5 million; 8: 3.5-4.5 million; 9: 4.5-5.5 
million; 10: 5.5-6.5 million; 11: 6.5-7.5 million; 12: 7.5-8.5 
million; 13: 8.5-10 million; 14: 10-12 million; 15: 12-14 million; 
16: 14-16 million; 17: 16-18.5 million; 18: 18.5-23 million; 19: 
> 23 million yen per annum 
Household income  1: none; 2: < 700,000 yen per annum; 3: 700,000-1 million; 4: 
1-1.3 million; 5: 1.3-1.5 million; 6: 1.5-2.5 million; 7: 2.5-3.5 
million; 8: 3.5-4.5 million; 9: 4.5-5.5 million; 10: 5.5-6.5 
million; 11: 6.5-7.5 million; 12: 7.5-8.5 million; 13: 8.5-10 
million; 14: 10-12 million; 15: 12-14 million; 16: 14-16 million; 
17: 16-18.5 million; 18: 18.5-23 million; 19: > 23 million yen 
per annum 
Improvement in financial 
situation 
Change in financial situation during last few years: 1: worse; 




Expected  size  of  pension  Pension better than what is paid now? 1: much worse; 2: 
somewhat worse; 3: about the same; 4: somewhat better; 5: 
much better 
Left-right placement  1: conservative;   2,  3,  4,    5: progressive 
Government responsible for 
reducing income inequality 
1: disagree; 2: somewhat disagree; 3: neither agree nor 
disagree; 4: somewhat agree; 5: agree 
Frequency of reading news-
paper 
1: never; 2: less than once a week; 3: about once a week; 4: 
several times a week; 5: almost every day 
General trust  1: no trust; 2: depends; 3: yes 
Regular family dinner  1: never; 2: about once a year; 3: several times a year; 4: 
About once a month; 5: About once a week; 6: Several times 
a week; 7: Almost every day 
Satisfied with family life  1: dissatisfied;   2,  3,  4,    5: satisfied 
Health condition  1: dissatisfied;   2,  3,  4,    5: satisfied 
Health satisfaction  1: dissatisfied;   2,  3,  4,    5: satisfied 
Community size  1: town/village; 2: other cities; 3: largest cities 




Table A2: Full models: Explaining responsibility for livelihood and care of the elderly 
  Livelihood of the elderly  Care of the elderly 
Variable Coefficient  SD  Coefficient  SD 
Age  effect:       
 Age  -0.002  0.008  0.021*  0.008 
 Age  squared  -0.0001  0.0001  -0.0003**  0.00001 
Gender  effect:       
  Female  -0.034  0.052 0.012 0.053 
Marital  status:       
 Single  -0.025  0.084  -0.077  0.084 
 Married  Reference 
 Separated/widowed  -0.015  0.070  -0.043  0.070 
No. of children  -0.033  0.020  -0.044*  0.021 
Education:       
 Mandatory  school  Reference 
 Secondary  education  -0.086  0.051  -0.056  0.051 
  Higher education (College)  -0.115  0.060  -0.097  0.061 
 Higher  education 
 (Graduate  school) 
-0.067 0.157  -0.006  0.157 
Employment  status       
 Full-time  employee  Reference 
  Part-time  employee  -0.028  0.074 0.018 0.074 
  Dispatched from personnel 
 agency 
-0.124 0.119  -0.136  0.122 
  Self-employed  -0.244**  0.076 -0.185* 0.077 
 Family  worker  -0.080  0.099  -0.104  0.099 
 Piece  worker  -0.243  0.188  -0.071  0.186 
 Retirees  0.038  0.127  -0.042  0.128 
  Unemployed  -0.085  0.160 0.039 0.160 
 Household  -0.028  0.107  -0.055  0.108 




Own job environment         
 Working  hours  0.001  0.002  -0.002  0.002 
  Corporation  size  0.014  0.008 0.007 0.008 
  Years of work  -0.001  0.002  -0.003  0.002 
 Second  job  0.011  0.188  -0.222  0.192 
 Second  job  working 
 hours 
0.002  0.011 0.004 0.011 
  Member of labour union  0.055  0.064  0.054  0.065 
  High probability of job 
 loss 
0.051  0.029 0.011 0.030 
Spouse  job  environment       
  Spouse working hours  -0.004**  0.001  -0.005**  0.001 
  Spouse corporation size  0.027**  0.010  0.031**  0.011 
Budget situation          
  Income main job  -0.009  0.010  0.009  0.010 
  Household  income  -0.028**  0.008 -0.019* 0.008 
  Improvement in financial 
 situation 
-0.165** 0.032  -0.224**  0.032 
  Expected size of pension  -0.118**  0.030  -0.107**  0.030 
Political  orientation       
  Left-right  placement  0.069**  0.021 0.095** 0.022 
 Government  responsible 
 for  reducing  income 
 inequality   
0.313**  0.018 0.240** 0.018 
Political party support         
  Liberal Democratic Party  -0.164**  0.049  -0.239**  0.050 
 Democratic  Party  -0.004  0.082  -0.050  0.082 
  New Komeito Party  0.070  0.112  0.080  0.111 
  Communist  Party  0.365  0.160 0.458** 0.160 
  Social Democrat Party  0.110  0.145  0.042  0.144 
 Other  party  -0.131  0.179  -0.096  0.181 
  No party support  Reference 
Information  indicator       
  Frequency of reading a
 newspaper 




Social  ties       
  General  trust  -0.018  0.032 0.014 0.033 
  Regular family dinner  0.006  0.012  -0.004  0.012 
  Satisfied with family 
 life 
-0.052* 0.021  -0.027  0.021 
  Desirable for three 
  generations to share a 
 home 
-0.091* 0.038  -0.129**  0.038 
Health  situation       
 Health  condition  -0.035  0.026  -0.033  0.027 
 Health  satisfaction  -0.051  0.029  -0.054  0.029 
Community  size  0.056*  0.028 0.034 0.029 
Time effects   
 Year  2000  Reference 
  Year  2001  -0.013  0.052 0.024 0.053 
  Year  2002  0.534**  0.052 0.781** 0.053 
  Year  2003  0.616**  0.061 0.780** 0.061 
  Year  2005  0.956**  0.065 1.230** 0.065 
Cut  values       
  Cut value 1  -2.842  0.300  -2.656  0.304 
  Cut value 2  -1.619  0.299  -1.359  0.302 
  Cut value 3  0.090  0.298  0.466  0.301 
  Cut value 4  1.386  0.299  1.974  0.302 
No. of observations  10,387  10,390 
Log likelihood  -14,917  -14,186 
LR Test  Chi
2(52) = 1223**  Chi
2(52) = 1247** 
Pseudo R
2 0.039  0.042 
Notes: For coding information on variables see Table A1 in the Appendix. SD: standard deviation. * 
(**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) level. 
 
 
 